



<http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com>

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS

ENGLAND & WALES - 2010

‘Thin blue line’ - or a very insignificant dot?

PC David Copperfield – “Wasting Police Time”

An investigative report based on freedom of information requests made of the 43 police forces in England & Wales.

Identifying for the very first time

How many police officers are **ACTUALLY** assigned to “response duties” attending to calls from the public

INTRODUCTION

NICE 1 LTD - WHO ARE WE? - WHAT IS THEFT PROTECT?

Nice 1 Ltd is a private limited company based in the West Midlands.

The company was formed to provide unique insurance solutions to the public, via a network of nationwide insurance brokers, motor manufacturers, dealers and vehicle finance companies.

Early in 2007, the Managing Director, Carl Brandrick, discovered that there were very few temporary vehicle solutions available for the victims of theft related incidents. The common misconception was that the insurance company of the victim would always arrange a replacement vehicle through the courtesy car programs. This is a myth.

In fact, courtesy cars are in fact provided by the crash repair centre, and only when the stolen vehicle is recovered AND only if the vehicle is repairable.

Theft Protect was created to assist victims of theft related incidents involving vehicles.

www.theftprotect.co.uk

HOW & WHY DID NICE 1 BECOME INVOLVED IN THE ANALYSIS OF CRIME?

The majority of UK motorists wrongly assume they will always be provided a replacement vehicle if their car is subject of a theft related incident.

In an effort to raise public awareness about car crime and the lack of solutions, the company created an internet blog <http://theftprotect.blogspot.com> where consumers are provided information about car crime in the UK, geographic hotspots, car crime trends, current modus operandi (M.O.) and free tips for car security.

Media headlines suggested that car crime was decreasing. This however, was not consistent with the claims experience of the company. Speaking to claimants on a daily basis, it was soon identified that a growing trend was emerging known as “Car Key Burglary”, where offenders force entry to a dwelling, searching for car keys to steal the family vehicle.

The car crime articles that were so prominent in the media, were often grossly misleading, as cars stolen with this M.O. were now lost among the burglary statistics. (In 2009, Jacqui Smith, then Home Secretary, responded to a House of Commons question about the volume of incidents by announcing that 18,600 vehicle thefts had occurred in 2008, which were classified as burglary or robbery offences, resulting in the illusion that car crime was decreasing more than it was in reality).

The company started simply enough, providing extracts from Home Office police recorded crime and the British Crime Survey, to its trading partners and motoring consumers.

Car Key Burglary rose to almost epidemic proportions, resulting in extensive TV and media coverage. The company had by now created internet portals for its broker partners <http://brokerinfocus.blogspot.com> and motor trade associates at <http://motorandfinance.blogspot.com> to help share their collective experience. The company works closely with insurance intermediaries, motor manufacturers and vehicle security companies to raise public awareness about car crime.

Due to the increasing interest in crime statistics, a further site was created <http://carcrimeuk.blogspot.com> specifically for this purpose. As the team delved deeper into crime statistics they discovered many anomalies and disparities in the two Home Office statistical crime sources, producing many analytical reports generating significant interest from the public and media.

Steve Bennett is a former police detective with the West Midlands force, engaged by the company with responsibility for the blog portals and analytical reporting.

Whilst trawling the internet for material for the sites, Steve stumbled across a very active blog written by a serving frontline response police inspector, using the pseudonym “Inspector Gadget”. <http://inspectorgadget.wordpress.com> So popular is the site and the informed musings of this highly experienced officer, that it recently hit 3 million visitor hits. Inspector Gadget now writes a regular piece for the “Times Online Crime Central”.

Links to other police sites revealed 30 – 40 other sites authored by serving, retired or former police officers. Many of these site authors are serving “response” officers, at the front line of policing in England & Wales, with current experience, educated and informed opinion about the significant obstructions that prevent police officers performing their responsibilities as effectively as they would wish.

Police Officers are, by virtue of the police regulations, prohibited from expressing a public opinion about certain matters, and would be subject to disciplinary proceedings should they knowingly bring a force or individual into disrepute. Many earlier police bloggers have closed their sites, undoubtedly for fear of the potential damage to careers. Those that survive, manage their sites under a cloak of anonymity.

These officers are most often conscientious, committed and loyal to a job that they love dearly. However, there are inherent problems that exist within the police service that they feel affect the service provided to the tax paying public. Officers create their blogs to vent their frustration and raise public awareness, in the hope that attention will be focused on the core issues within the service.

Steve Bennett created <http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com> as an independent voice in support of the front line officers. Whilst the police blogs will often describe day to day events (protecting the identity of victims, witnesses and suspects on a localized level), Thin Blue line set out to identify the core issues preventing the delivery of effective policing, to source relevant data and information to investigate the issues in detail, producing analytical reports.

Examples of the reports collated over recent months can be viewed and downloaded at <http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com>

For further information about Nice 1 Ltd, Theft Protect and any of the internet sites referred to, please contact : steve.bennett@nice-1.co.uk

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

SOME BACKGROUND TO THE REPORT

Frontline police response numbers is a very emotive subject, both to the officers engaged in that role and to the public in receipt of the service they provide from limited resources.

Having seen many media articles on the subject, the topic really hit home when we read “Wasting Police Time” by PC David Copperfield (Stuart Davidson, formerly of Staffordshire Police, now resident in Canada). Stuart still authors his blog at <http://coppersblog.blogspot.com>

Often hilarious, brutally honest and informative, the book details many of the problems facing frontline officers.

This extract spells out the need for a serious examination of the allocation of resources to the front line response within forces:-

“My morning shift begins at 07:00hrs, with a briefing from the sergeant. This is called a parade, like they used to have in Hill Street Blues, where the old boy would end with a fatherly, ‘Be careful out there’.

So what do you imagine our morning parades are like?

Serried ranks of stern-faced constables wearing dark blue capes and carrying truncheons?

Eager hordes of law enforcement freaks champing at the bit to get out there and kick illegal butt?

Two dozen Robocops, checking their CS gas and body armour and practising their take-down techniques?

Er, not exactly.

The other day I turned up on my own to the morning parade. I don’t mean I had got the wrong room, or turned up late after everyone had gone.

I mean I was the only uniformed officer on duty that day, in a town of about 60,000 people.

Let me just spell that out again: the population of the town in which I work is about 60,000, and I was the ONLY UNIFORMED OFFICER ON DUTY AT THAT POINT.

True, there were other uniformed officers inside the police station; there were even a few officers on duty who were not wearing a uniform. But as for officers,

in uniform, on duty and able to deploy to a call from a member of the public, there was only me.

The 'thin blue line' had become a very insignificant dot. Even at full strength, we're never going to be particularly terrifying to criminals: there should have been three others, not including the sergeant. But one was sick, one was on a course and the other was due at court later that day.

I have always thought the public sector is slightly top heavy, on the admin side, so I checked the car park at about 10:00hrs. Sure enough, it was packed.

Our staffing levels are closely controlled and monitored, and we have whole departments within the force geared to ensuring that the right balance of uniformed officers and civilian staff are employed.

Staffing is the subject of strategy meetings at the highest level. In fact, the whole issue is so important it cannot be left up to the minds of mere mortals. No, we have a computer system which plans and manages 'human resources' (people). It's called HRMS, or Human Resource Management System. I don't think it works very well.

It is a mantra of senior management in the Police Service and at the Home Office that 'ordinary people' overestimate the volume of crime. 'Ordinary people cannot be expected to know the realities of crime and how it can be prevented,' runs the argument. 'Furthermore, they cannot interpret the statistics the way we can. If they could, they would be able to see that crime was actually going down, not up.'

I like to ask ordinary people about how much crime they think there is, and perhaps they do overestimate it. The thing is, I often ask them to estimate the number of officers on duty, too, and they also overestimate that. Usually by a factor of ten”.

Inspector Gadget is responsible for a response team of officers and is among the best qualified and most experienced officers, with a gift for directly addressing the flaws and inadequacies of the present resource allocation strategy.

In his book “Perverting The Course Of Justice” he comments:-

“Thousands of officers who could and should be on the streets deterring and nicking criminals are employed behind desks 'auditing' crime reports and managing detection figures. I am concerned that our insane obsession with largely irrelevant targets will eventually cost lives. It probably already has.

It is not enough to tinker around the edges: major change is needed if you want us to be able to respond quickly to your burglary or assault or mugging – or maybe even stand a chance of preventing them from happening in the first place.

Like PC Copperfield, I'm a real police officer writing under a pseudonym about his job as a front line 'Response' officer. There are lots of other cops, some doing very worthwhile jobs, others sat in offices doing nothing in particular, but I'm writing about leading those who come out (eventually) when you call 999. The people Response police arrest are probably not much like you. We don't really deal with normal, law-abiding folks, we deal with seriously violent thugs who attack others for no reason, who viciously beat and rob old ladies, who pimp out their own children, who think first, last and always of themselves at the expense of others. Unlike Copperfield, I'm an Inspector, two ranks above him. This means that I have a bit less of the day-to-day contact with members of the public than he had but more of a handle on the theory and practice of police Bureaucracy

I work for a force I call 'Ruralshire Constabulary'. Without being too specific, it covers a population well into seven figures, across an area of hundreds of square miles and a number of towns, some large, some small. I'm based in 'F Division' – a couple of hundred square miles, a population of around 300,000 people and six or seven decent-sized conurbations.

Lots of the stories and views in here are controversial; you won't find members of the Association of Chief Police Officers queuing up to agree with me. It's my thoughts and experiences, from my perspective. I don't trust official crime figures or press releases personally, but to get the full, unbiased picture you probably need to read that sort of stuff, too, and be aware that there are others who see things differently from me.

It's not all about pens and form-filling – we still do get to help people, catch criminals and lock them up, and I wouldn't change my job, for all its frustrations, for anything. Every day can bring moments of fear, distress and jubilation, often within the same hour, and not many people can say that.

A NUMBERS GAME

THE other Friday, someone said to me, 'In my day, there was an Inspector, two Sergeants and 16 PCs at my nick.'

I said, 'We haven't got that many on duty in the whole division tonight.'

It's tough to provide people with what I would regard as a decent service with the strength we have on paper – with the strength we have in reality, it's near enough impossible.

I think most really senior police officers don't appreciate how few people we have physically out there every night, and I'm sure the media and politicians are equally unaware. I do think the public are starting to cotton on, but who cares about them?

Part of the problem, I think, is that the majority of officers of Superintendent rank and above come from a time when a much bigger proportion of the total police strength actually was on the ground, doing the job. Even if they're told that we're stretched, they look at the number of staff the force employs and it just doesn't make sense to them. So they don't believe it.

As PC Copperfield always said, there may well be enough police – there may well be more than there ever have been – it's just that a huge number of them are working 9-5, Monday to Friday on Neighborhood Policing or in offices, auditing and managing. We need them out on the streets, at night, at weekends, able to respond when crime actually happens.

I sit in our morning meetings, and I listen to the tactical plans being discussed, and I think, where are they getting the bodies from for all this?

You can quite often find yourself on your own policing a sizeable town. You will start with your team on a Saturday night, and you're immediately nicking people for criminal damage, smashing shop windows, drink driving, fighting.

Within an hour, everyone else is tied up and there's only you still out and about.

One evening a while ago, I remember standing in the High Street on my own, with hundreds of people around me, thinking, 'That's it. All my people are gone, back in Central Custody, nine miles away. I am the only police officer left.'

Just then, my radio went, calling me to a heroin-wracked shoplifter who was threatening to stick needles into a member of staff at a late-night chemists she was trying to steal drugs from.

And no sooner had that call come in than there was another, to go to a pub where the management were asking for urgent assistance because one of their people had been bottled and the guy was still there.

I stood there, literally thinking, Who is most likely to die? I decided that I had to go to the chemists, on the basis that there were bouncers at the pub and none at the shop. Luckily, as soon as I got there the offender was compliant. But I had to nick her – and that was me gone as well. In the end, I managed to get officers down from another town to transport her to custody, though they didn't want to come because that meant their town was empty. This stuff is going on day after day, but if you talk to people at Headquarters, where the car park is rammed during normal office hours, they don't seem to get it.

REALITY

SO what is reality?

When I come on as the Duty Inspector on a Thursday, Friday or Saturday night – in these times of 24/7 licensing and all that brings with it – I will have

something like three Sergeants and 20 PCs on Response, plus a couple of Custody Sergeants and a few gaolers.

Available to me from the centre will be one dog unit, as long as it's not employed elsewhere. I also have the ability to get firearms units in, if necessary.

Neighbourhood Policing have all gone home, because they work Monday to Friday, 9-5 – you know, when all the crime happens. All the squads – Domestic Violence, Car Crime, Burglary etc etc – have gone home, too, for the same reason. As have all the PCSOs, because they're not allowed to work after dark in case they get attacked.

I've explained how big my area is. I have 20 PCs, split around six different reporting stations (most of which are closed to the public) to cover it. Only I don't

The moment I start work, one of the Central Custody Sergeants will be on the phone saying that his oppo is sick so he needs a Sergeant down there – and he does need one, because they will be turning over a lot of prisoners during the night. So I'll have to pull one of the skippers (Sergeants) off the street and send him to custody, replacing him with a PC as an acting Sergeant (so that's a PC out of a crew.)

Then we'll discover that two of the gaolers are off – one is sick and the other is on a course. So I'll have to provide a couple of PCs for custody, too. From the shift itself, with colds and flu and sickness bugs and busted noses and courses and secondments, there will always be two or three people missing from the 20 down on paper. Let's say one Sergeant and two PCs (that means another PC is acting-up as a Sergeant).

Another will be on annual leave. Two more will be working on MISPER enquires (of which, more later).

Then, as sure as eggs are eggs, I will have two officers out making an arrest and the suspect will 'collapse' and claim he has taken an overdose. This will obviously be a lie, but we can't be too careful, can we, so my guys will have to take him to hospital and wait with him until he is given the all-clear. (We have to use two officers to transport prisoners now, in case allegations are made against us and for Health and Safety reasons – a lone officer concentrating on driving is too vulnerable to attack from the kind of nutters we deal with.) By the time he's been seen by a doctor and admitted as a precaution, five or six hours

have gone by and those two officers will therefore be out of action for the entire shift. As soon as he is judged fit to be released, he will be brought to the station. As soon as he gets to the station, he will claim he has 'chest pains'. Two different officers will then convey him back to hospital and wait with him again.

This is a game, and it is happening all over Britain, all the time; I don't think that senior officers, politicians and the media really appreciate that.

Now, the main nick's front counter will need covering later on; civvies don't like working there at night, because all the lunatics come in ranting and raving and trying try to take them out across the desk, so I'll lose another bobby there.

Where does that leave me, an hour into the evening? I'm down 10 PCs and two Sergeants. I haven't even mentioned my own sickness and leave and courses, yet.

So even the 23 bodies I've got on paper, with which to cover 300,000 people across our vast area, isn't reality. When we start arresting people, the very thin blue line we have shrinks further still. I'll talk in a bit about the length of time it takes to nick people and book them in but, for now, suffice it to say that having someone in for a simple criminal damage can easily take an officer out of the game for four hours, even when the suspect admits it.

*There is *Late Turn, yes, which overlaps until the early hours, but these guys have been taking emergency calls, solid, since the afternoon. They are in custody with prisoners, or waiting for solicitors or interpreters or appropriate adults, or interviewing, or calling CPS Direct**, or writing, photocopying and faxing reams of paperwork, or transporting people to mental hospitals, or at cordons at road crashes, or at people's houses taking statements, or trying to get something to eat. They may have gone off duty sick or injured, or they may be up at the hospital getting details from a road crash victim or waiting with another 'overdoser', or they may be doing breathalysers, but the one thing they are not doing is waiting for me to click my fingers so they can come running.*

Trust me, they are fully soaked up.

We get 3,000 calls a day in my force, spread across a number of divisions. In my patch, I have a dozen or fewer people to cover our end of it; I don't care what the stats say, or anyone says, that is reality, that is the bottom line

**Late Turn is one of our three shifts. Early Turn runs from breakfast time to mid-afternoon. Late turn is mid-afternoon until the middle of the night. Nights is the middle of the evening until breakfast time. There's an overlap of about two hours between Late Turn and Nights.*

***CPS Direct is part of the Crown Prosecution Service – more detail about this later.*

I have never seen the Area Commander, or anyone from 'Human Resources' or the Press Office or Training, down on the streets with me on a Saturday night, physically counting heads (or cracking them). They have no idea at all what it is like.

You do, occasionally, see an ACPO rank out. But when a Chief comes down on the street there are more uniformed police out than there would be for England vs Germany in the World Cup final.

Neighbourhood are out, Specials are out, anyone with arms, legs and a functioning pelvis is out; why the Chiefs can't see what's going on I do not know, because it must have happened in their day. But apparently they can't – they walk around, nodding and grinning and surrounded by blue serge tunics and hi-vis jackets, and they think it's all hunky dory.

In the Army, an infantry battalion of 500 men will consist of 75% front line soldiers – people with rifles, there to deal with the enemy – and 25% in HQ support roles. In the police, 10% are on the frontline and everyone else is back at base, drinking tea and making plans. It's quite mad.

You can still be reassured, I think, that our ability to respond to level two criminality – what would be classified as serious crime like rapes, stabbings and murders – is and will remain very good, because we find ways of dealing with that sort of stuff. But in terms of keeping the lid on day-to-day 'volume crime' – the anti-social behaviour, the criminal damage, the assaults, the drunkenness, the violence, the car theft, the problems that you're most likely to suffer from... Being ex-Army, I've learned the hard way to make the most of what I have in front of me. We get on and do our jobs, whatever the manning levels. Somehow, we have made it happen without major outbreaks of live anarchy. How much longer we can continue along this road, I really don't know.

The frustrating thing is, the answer is reasonably simple. Get police officers out of cushy offices and 9-5 jobs, onto the streets.

Spend the money wasted on PCSOs on more proper cops. Cut paperwork and stop massaging figures. Stop chasing targets and trying to socially engineer a new country. Concentrate on criminals, missing kids and road accidents.

But maybe that's all too revolutionary for modern tastes".

Both books make compelling reading, and there are others out there now too in a similar vein. Police blogs we view every day are littered with hundreds of examples, from officers of every force, detailing the impact of real life situations worsened by a lack of resource in this essential area of response policing. We have many of those entries collated in our files should anyone wish to view them.

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUESTS

Early in January 2010, an FOI request was sent to each of the 43 police forces asking the questions:

1. Please provide the total numbers of officers by rank within your force for 2009
2. How many of those officers were assigned to response duties in 2009
3. What are the non response administrative departments within your force?
4. How many police officers are assigned to each of these departments, by rank?

All requests were submitted via the website <http://www.whatdotheyknow.com> which sends automatic e mail updates when a force has replied.

All but five forces had sent responses :-

- City of London
- Dyfed-Powys
- Gwent
- Lancashire
- Merseyside

The forces that have responded account for 132,874 of the police officers of England & Wales. This represents 92% of the officers using the March 2009 strength figures of 143,725.

THE QUALITY OF RESPONSES

It was surprising that the quality differed so dramatically from force to force. Some forces listed the responses on the reply page on the site. This necessitated copying the data into an excel spreadsheet and formatting the rows and columns to align correctly with the response.

Other forces attached a word or pdf document, requiring the same cut and paste process. Some forces submitted an excel spreadsheet, which made transposing their data an easier task.

Most forces were prompt and helpful with their replies, whilst a number required detailed clarification before a response would be provided.

A few forces were completely open with their understanding, interpretation and declaration of the term “response”, whilst others stressed that a wider selection of officer roles could be categorized as response. Indeed, one force stated that as their ACC and Learning Superintendent had affected an arrest during the year, they too should be considered response. Whilst not wishing to dismiss the efforts of the officers, isolated occurrences would not justify grouping all ACPO ranks under the heading “response”.

We will look at the responses shortly, but first a note on police functions and categories as defined by the Home Office guidelines.

The definitions of the respective officer roles fall into one of three categories:-

- **Operational:** any member of staff, including covert staff, whose primary role (i.e. over 50 per cent of their time) is directly to deliver the overarching aims of the Police Service. To 'directly deliver' the role must involve routine and immediate interface (either face to face or by telephone) with the public, including covert operational staff in such roles can be considered as frontline service providers;
- **Operational support:** any member of staff whose primary role is to support the delivery of the overarching aims of the Police Service;
- **Organisational support:** any member of staff whose primary role is to service the internal needs of the organisation.

Each function performed by officers is categorized as either Operational, Operational Support or Organisational Support.

For the purposes of the FOI requests submitted, “Response” falls under the category Operational.

However, some forces, when completing their returns, considered all operational, or a disproportionate and unrealistic number of the Operational category as “Response”. For the purposes of these enquiries, we wanted to establish the levels of officers who would actually respond to calls from the public.

At Appendix A is a full list of the 62 Home Office function definitions. The category that best fits this description is **(30) 1. Foot/Car/Beat Patrol – Operational** - *The ACPO Working Group on Patrol settled on the definition: "The overt presence, whether on foot or mobile, of a locally accountable uniformed police constable who provides public reassurance and who is approachable and available to ensure an appropriate response from all the resources of the police service, to the needs and demands of the general public". Thus, include staff who are predominantly assigned to operational patrol in uniform either on foot, on a pedal/motor cycle or in a motor vehicle (includes 'Home Beat', etc). Also include Task force/support group/territorial patrol. Do not include traffic and motorway patrol (see 54) and members of dogs' sections (see 22). Officers of supervisory rank who perform patrol duties, e.g. shift supervisors, should be included. Local beat/home beat officers should be included. Specials should be included. Do not include recruits undergoing training on modules 1 - 7 (see 46).*

Clearly, officers designated a function that is purely Organisational or Operationally Supportive, would not ordinarily respond to calls from the public and could not therefore fit into the normal understanding of the term “response”.

So, “Response” Officers fall under the Operational category only.

What has to be established is the realistic likelihood of the Operational function answering calls from the public as a regular part of their day-to-day role. For that reason, we concurred with the frontline officers and a number of the more open forces, who also determined that “response” meant Foot/Car/Beat Patrol as defined by section 30 of the guide.

When forces submitted returns with excessively high “response” numbers and percentages, the figures were adjusted in a further analysis, in line with a Home Office designated comparable force.

The <http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk> website provides a page where the results of recent force inspections have been entered. On the respective page for each force, the site lists which of the other forces are most comparable in terms of challenges, strength and other measurable factors.

This can be viewed at :-

<http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/performance-and-measurement/performance-assessment/apacs-2008-2009/index.html>

This enabled us to most accurately adjust the few forces who clearly overstated their response commitment. Both the originally submitted dataset and the comparably adjusted sets are included within this document.

A list of the force comparables is listed at Appendix C at the end of the document.

In conclusion, to clarify, the definition of “response” based on front line officers input across the forces would seem to be that most closely fitting the following :-

“Officers assigned and available to respond and attend to calls from the general public as a regular element of their daily responsibility as opposed to officers whose functions do not usually include such response activity”.

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THE NUMBERS

Most of the forces submitted two sets of numbers in response to the enquiry:-

- The actual head count of officers
- The FTE (Full time equivalent) numbers – (including part time numbers)

The FTE numbers were selected for the purpose of the comparisons drawn to provide consistency throughout.

As stated, whilst many forces provided a thorough breakdown of officer functions, by numbers and rank, certain forces provided the bare minimum of detail sufficient to compile the analysis.

The data received was checked against force website entries for organizational structure. Norfolk for example specifically stated on the site that 500 officers are designated as “response” as opposed to their FOI reply that suggested their entire county delivery unit of 923 officers were “response”. However, the 923 includes safer neighbourhood teams who would not ordinarily be considered response, so the 500 quoted on the website is more accurate in terms of the request.

Many forces supplied an Operational figure, together with their reduced interpretation of the “response” figure, which still contains either neighbourhood officers or other categories that would not normally be attributable to response. In these cases, where it was not possible to drill the figure down still further by cross checking websites and other sources, the higher figure was entered, with an indicator of ↓ to reflect that it is overstated. When a force provided what is believed to be the true response number an indicator of ✓ is displayed alongside it. In this way, it can be seen that even the drilled down totals we have produced are still overstated.

To assist the reader, we have included a “useful comments” page in the appendices, (Appendix B), listing each force and details of the “Operational” or “Response” breakdown they have provided.

On the pages that follow, we will reproduce the findings from the FOI requests.

Two spreadsheet examples illustrate :-

- The actual number submissions from each force
- An adjusted model, taking into account “overstated submissions” (where forces have stated either Operational totals as response levels, or included non response functions in the response totals).

Each set of findings will be accompanied by explanatory notes, referring to the individual force useful notes in the appendices, and our observations and conclusions.

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THE NUMBERS – TABLE A – ACTUAL SUBMISSIONS FROM FOI REQUESTS

Police Force	Police Officers	Operational	Operational %	Response	Response %	☑
Avon & Somerset	3,331	2,994	90%	1,602	48%	✓
Bedfordshire	1,269	1,181	93%	318	25%	✓
Cambridgeshire	1,458	1,458	100%	1,458	100%	↓
Cheshire	2,233	2,023	91%	1,419	64%	↓
Cleveland	1,740	1,616	93%	457	26%	✓
Cumbria	1,262	1,105	88%	833	66%	↓
Derbyshire	2,065	1,201	58%	1,105	54%	↓
Devon & Cornwall	3,546	3,369	95%	1,781	50%	↓
Dorset	1,516	741	49%	670	44%	↓
Durham	1,551	1,464	94%	1,435	93%	↓
Dyfed-Powys			#DIV/0!		#DIV/0!	↓
Essex	3,565		0%		0%	↓
Gloucestershire	1,357	1,085	80%	545	40%	↓
Greater Manchester	8,299	7,279	88%	7,139	86%	↓
Gwent			#DIV/0!		#DIV/0!	↓
Hampshire	3,723		0%	1,404	38%	↓
Hertfordshire	2,158	2,016	93%	1,480	69%	↓
Humberside	2,112	2,040	97%	2,040	97%	↓
Kent	3,799	2,971	78%	1,347	35%	✓
Lancashire			#DIV/0!		#DIV/0!	↓
Leicestershire	2,362	1,298	55%	1,298	55%	↓
Lincolnshire	1,202	1,169	97%	868	72%	↓
London, City of			#DIV/0!		#DIV/0!	↓
Merseyside			#DIV/0!		#DIV/0!	↓
Metropolitan Police	33,322	25,301	76%	13,621	41%	↓
Norfolk	1,698	1,627	96%	500	29%	✓
North Wales	1,596	1,531	96%	729	46%	↓
North Yorkshire	1,379		0%	343	25%	✓
Northamptonshire	1,345	1,155	86%	647	48%	↓
Northumbria	4,102	3,942	96%	2,730	67%	↓
Nottinghamshire	2,395	1,801	75%	816	34%	✓
South Wales	3,163	2,616	83%	2,646	84%	↓
South Yorkshire	3,006	2,554	85%	934	31%	✓
Staffordshire	2,211	1,977	89%	1,977	89%	↓
Suffolk	1,291	1,256	97%	696	54%	↓
Surrey	1,840	1,667	91%	432	23%	✓
Sussex	3,257	3,058	94%	1,057	32%	↓
Thames Valley	4,518	4,503	100%	1,187	26%	↓
Warwickshire	989	925	94%	491	50%	↓
West Mercia	2,426	2,301	95%	1,366	56%	↓
West Midlands	8,748	8,178	93%	1,831	21%	✓
West Yorkshire	5,831	3,191	55%	2,480	43%	↓
Wiltshire	1,209	779	64%	558	46%	↓

Total of 43 forces 132,874 103,372 78% 62,240 47%

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

THE NUMBERS – TABLE A – EXPLANATORY NOTES

- 5 forces highlighted in purple had not supplied data at the time of this report.
- 38 forces responded with total officer numbers of 132,874 – 92% of the 2009 force strength numbers.
- Officers assigned to Operational functions 103,372 (78% of the total).
- FOI returns suggest response numbers to be 62,240 (47% of the total).
- Where forces had submitted actual response numbers, in line with the section 30 definition, ✓ appears alongside.
- Forces that overstated response numbers declaring the total Operational numbers or including non response functions in the count are marked ↓

Frontline officers confirmed that the 47% was grossly overstated.

“Operational” does NOT equal “Response”. Only a small number of the operational counts for each force are actually engaged in response duties, responding and attending to calls from the public.

Whatever the true response numbers, these would have to be divided by a factor of 4 to cover the three shift system and to account for rest days.

Annual leave, courses and sickness would also have to be factored into the real numbers of officers available for response duty.

Clearly, we had to look deeper into the submissions for the true answers.

On the page that follows, we will show our adjusted dataset. To give each force the benefit of the doubt on numbers, we have applied best case principles.

Looking deeper into the FOI returns, many had also disclosed numbers for the section 30 definition of response. In these cases, we substituted the true response numbers for those that had been overstated. This enabled us to clarify more precisely, the response numbers for a further three forces.

Of the remaining forces, some had provided operational numbers as their response submission. Others had included non response functions within their counts. In these cases, we looked at each force in turn and identified the comparable forces as per the Home Office Analysis of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) Performance data list at Appendix C. Applying best case, we selected the comparable force with the highest response % and substituted that percentage for the overstated number.

Let's look at the adjusted dataset.

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

THE NUMBERS – TABLE B – MORE ACCURATE PICTURE OF RESPONSE LEVELS

Police Force	Police Officers	Operational	Operational %	Response	Response %	☑
Avon & Somerset	3,331	2,994	90%	1,602	48%	✓
Bedfordshire	1,269	1,181	93%	318	25%	✓
Cambridgeshire	1,458	1,385	95%	729	50%	↓
Cheshire	2,233	2,023	91%	742	33%	✓
Cleveland	1,740	1,616	93%	457	26%	✓
Cumbria	1,262	1,105	88%	681	54%	↓
Derbyshire	2,065	1,201	58%	1,105	54%	↓
Devon & Cornwall	3,546	3,369	95%	1,781	50%	↓
Dorset	1,516	741	49%	527	35%	✓
Durham	1,551	1,464	94%	838	54%	↓
Dyfed-Powys	1,197	1,161	97%	646	54%	↓
Essex	3,565	3,387	95%	1,961	55%	↓
Gloucestershire	1,357	1,085	80%	545	40%	↓
Greater Manchester	8,299	7,279	88%	4,067	49%	↓
Gwent	1,438	1,395	97%	777	54%	↓
Hampshire	3,723	3,462	93%	1,404	38%	✓
Hertfordshire	2,158	2,016	93%	1,036	48%	↓
Humberside	2,112	2,040	97%	718	34%	↓
Kent	3,799	2,971	78%	1,347	35%	✓
Lancashire	3,753	3,490	93%	2,064	55%	↓
Leicestershire	2,362	1,298	55%	1,298	55%	↓
Lincolnshire	1,202	1,169	97%	649	54%	↓
London, City of	813	772	95%	366	45%	↓
Merseyside	4,494	4,314	96%	2,202	49%	↓
Metropolitan Police	33,322	25,301	76%	13,621	41%	↓
Norfolk	1,698	1,627	96%	500	29%	✓
North Wales	1,596	1,531	96%	729	46%	↓
North Yorkshire	1,379	883	64%	343	25%	✓
Northamptonshire	1,345	1,155	86%	647	48%	↓
Northumbria	4,102	3,942	96%	2,010	49%	↓
Nottinghamshire	2,395	1,801	75%	816	34%	✓
South Wales	3,163	2,616	83%	1,518	48%	↓
South Yorkshire	3,006	2,554	85%	934	31%	✓
Staffordshire	2,211	1,977	89%	1,106	50%	↓
Suffolk	1,291	1,256	97%	696	54%	↓
Surrey	1,840	1,667	91%	432	23%	✓
Sussex	3,257	3,058	94%	1,057	32%	↓
Thames Valley	4,518	4,503	100%	1,187	26%	↓
Warwickshire	989	925	94%	491	50%	↓
West Mercia	2,426	2,301	95%	1,366	56%	↓
West Midlands	8,748	8,178	93%	1,831	21%	✓
West Yorkshire	5,831	3,191	55%	2,480	43%	↓
Wiltshire	1,209	779	64%	558	46%	↓

Total of 43 forces 144,569 122,164 85% 60,181 42%

	Forces provided operational figures as equivalent "response" (some including ACPO & specialist officers as response), or included non response functions. Adjusted to reflect that of the highest comparable force data.
	Forces had not returned FOI Data. Force strength taken from prior year & highest comparable force % used
	Force did not provide operational data. Highest comparable force % used to complete.

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

THE NUMBERS – TABLE B – EXPLANATORY NOTES

- Across both datasets, the forces that declared the section 30 definition of “response” returned a markedly lower response percentage than those who had chosen to include other functions within their count. These ten forces from the first dataset (marked with a ✓), produce an average of 30% of their force total strength being assigned to response duties.
- For the 5 forces that have not returned FOI requests, the force strength numbers for the March 2009 period were inserted.
- For these 5 forces, the best comparable force numbers were inserted to arrive at a complete dataset.
- This produced a total force numbers (FTE) of 144,569 officers
- Where forces had disclosed numbers for the section 30 definition of response but overstated their number, we substituted the true response numbers for those that had been overstated. This enabled us to clarify more precisely, the response numbers for a further three forces.
- Some forces provided operational numbers as their response submission. Others had included non response functions within their counts. In these cases, we looked at each force in turn and identified the comparable forces as per the Home Office list at Appendix C. Applying best case, we selected the comparable force with the highest response % and substituted that percentage for the overstated number.
- With adjustments the response numbers reduce to 60,181 (42% of the new total).
- From the dataset and information provided, forces with a more accurate response percentage now have ✓ appearing alongside.
- In view of the 10 force validated average of 30%, even with adjustments in their favour, 30 of the forces continue to display an overstated response percentage. These forces on the second dataset are marked with ↓

Frontline officers confirm that even the 42% remains grossly overstated.

Even if the adjusted dataset were accepted as a true response level, this would have to be divided by a factor of 4 to cover the three shift system and to account for rest days. Annual leave, courses and sickness would also have to be factored into the real numbers of officers available for response duty.

The Analysis of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) Performance 2008/09 reports an annual sickness across the forces of 3.7% of potential working hours lost due to sickness. Page 2 of the report contained at the link below refers.

http://www.police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/performance-and-measurement/apacs-2008-09/National_Table_APACS_0809_v22835.pdf?view=Binary

A straight lift from the police federation website confirms the annual leave entitlement of officers as follows :-

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

THE NUMBERS – TABLE B – EXPLANATORY NOTES (CONTINUED)

ANNUAL LEAVE

The annual leave entitlements (expressed in 8 hour days) for the federated ranks are found in Regulation 33, Annex O:

Years of relevant service	Annual Leave Entitlement	
	Days	Hours Equivalent
Less than 2	22	176
2 or more	25	200
10 or more	27	216
15 or more	28	224
20 or more	30	240

For this exercise, we will assume that the response officers are 2 or more years in service, entitled to 25 days annual leave. The Home Office indicates officers will take 120 rest days leaving 220 working days a year.

Days in year	365	(100%)
Less Annual leave	25	(7%)
Less rest days	120	(33%)
Working days	220	(60%)

Police response teams provide cover 365 days a year, 24 hours per day, around the clock. That is 8760 hours requiring coverage, or 2920 8 hour shifts. This is required across 43 police forces, protecting 54 million members of the public.

We will leave the annual leave and sickness maths to someone else for now, but we can see it will have a dramatic effect on reducing the response numbers available at any one time considerably. Our estimation is that it is likely that the 60,000 officers assigned to response, divided by the 3 shift patterns and rest days, annual leave, sickness and courses, will reflect that the number of officers at any given time available for response duties is likely to be around 10 – 15,000, which is pretty scary when the population figures are taken into account.

POPULATION TO RESPONSE OFFICER RATIO

<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb1309supptabs2.xls>

In publications from the Home Office concerning officer strength, such as the one above, some startling errors become evident when comparing the population to officer ratio. On the page that follows we have condensed the information for simplicity and followed that with a dataset to compare the population to “response officer ratio”. We will discuss the findings after the reports.

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

THE NUMBERS – POPULATION TO FTE POLICE OFFICER RATIO

Police Force	Home Office Record of Police officers	Home Office Report of Police officers per 100,000 population ³
Avon & Somerset	3,356	213
Bedfordshire	1,244	209
Cambridgeshire	1,450	191
Cheshire ⁴	2,140	213
Cleveland	1,756	314
Cumbria	1,284	258
Derbyshire	2,137	215
Devon & Cornwall	3,556	213
Dorset	1,512	213
Durham	1,588	263
Dyfed-Powys	1,197	236
Essex	3,484	206
Gloucestershire	1,372	235
Greater Manchester	8,232	321
Gwent	1,438	257
Hampshire	3,811	207
Hertfordshire	2,172	204
Humberside	2,110	233
Kent	3,799	231
Lancashire	3,753	259
Leicestershire	2,363	243
Lincolnshire	1,229	177
London, City of	813	10,190
Merseyside	4,494	333
Metropolitan Police	32,610	432
Norfolk	1,668	198
North Wales	1,586	234
North Yorkshire	1,460	185
Northamptonshire	1,326	196
Northumbria	4,111	294
Nottinghamshire	2,408	227
South Wales	3,146	255
South Yorkshire	3,053	235
Staffordshire	2,211	208
Suffolk	1,291	182
Surrey	1,872	170
Sussex	3,196	208
Thames Valley	4,317	198
Warwickshire	994	189
West Mercia	2,471	208
West Midlands	8,637	332
West Yorkshire	5,854	268
Wiltshire	1,224	191
Total of 43 forces	143,725	266

1. These figures are based on full-time equivalents that have been rounded to the nearest whole number, due to rounding there may be an apparent discrepancy between totals and the sums of constituent items. Figures include those officers on career breaks

2. Airport BCUs do not have a population attributed to them.

3. The very high number of officers per 100,000 population in city centres are partly owing to the use of small resident population figures as the denominator.

4. Figures for Cheshire exclude officers on career breaks.

5. Figures for three Sussex BCUs revised on 24 September 2009, as they had been previously allocated to the wrong BCUs. The Sussex total is unaffected.

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

THE NUMBERS – POPULATION TO RESPONSE OFFICER RATIO

Force	Population	FTE Officer Count 2009	Population Per FTE Officer	Response Officers	Population Per Response Officer
Avon and Somerset	1,579,000	3,356	471	1,602	986
Bedfordshire	596,000	1,244	479	318	1,874
Cambridgeshire	761,000	1,450	525	729	1,044
Cheshire	1,004,000	2,140	469	742	1,353
Cleveland	560,000	1,756	319	457	1,225
Cumbria	497,000	1,284	387	681	729
Derbyshire	996,000	2,137	466	1,105	901
Devon and Cornwall	1,667,000	3,556	469	1,781	936
Dorset	708,000	1,512	468	527	1,343
Durham	605,000	1,588	381	838	722
Dyfed-Powys	507,000	1,197	423	646	784
Essex	1,688,000	3,484	484	1,961	861
Gloucestershire	583,000	1,372	425	545	1,070
GMP (Gtr Manchester)	2,562,000	8,232	311	4,067	630
Gwent	560,000	1,438	389	777	721
Hampshire	1,845,000	3,811	484	1,404	1,314
Hertfordshire	1,066,000	2,172	491	1,036	1,029
Humberside	908,000	2,110	430	718	1,264
Kent	1,647,000	3,799	434	1,347	1,223
Lancashire	1,451,000	3,753	387	2,064	703
Leicestershire	972,000	2,363	411	1,298	749
Lincolnshire	693,000	1,229	564	649	1,068
City of London	8,000	813	10	366	22
Merseyside	1,350,000	4,494	300	2,202	613
Metropolitan	7,549,000	32,610	231	13,621	554
Norfolk	841,000	1,668	504	500	1,682
North Wales	679,000	1,586	428	729	931
North Yorkshire	789,000	1,460	540	343	2,300
Northamptonshire	678,000	1,326	511	647	1,048
Northumbria	1,400,000	4,111	341	2,010	697
Nottinghamshire	1,061,000	2,408	441	816	1,300
South Wales	1,234,000	3,146	392	1,518	813
South Yorkshire	1,299,000	3,053	425	934	1,391
Staffordshire	1,065,000	2,211	482	1,106	963
Suffolk	709,000	1,291	549	696	1,019
Surrey	1,098,000	1,872	586	432	2,542
Sussex	1,538,000	3,196	481	1,057	1,455
Thames Valley	2,180,000	4,317	505	1,187	1,837
Warwickshire	527,000	994	530	491	1,073
West Mercia	1,186,000	2,471	480	1,366	868
West Midlands	2,604,000	8,637	302	1,831	1,422
West Yorkshire	2,181,000	5,854	373	2,480	879
Wiltshire	642,000	1,224	524	558	1,151

43 Force Totals 54,072,000 143,725 376 60,181 898

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

THE NUMBERS – POPULATION TO RESPONSE OFFICER RATIO

- The report on page 21 is a condensed version of the Home Office download.
- When multiplying the number of officers at that point by the population per officer, the population figure for England & Wales does not ring true.
- The total arrived at is 49,523,832, whereas our own reports downloaded from the Office of National Statistics for 2008/9 totaling each of the force areas reflect 54,072,000.
- It is difficult to see how the Home Office statisticians have arrived at an overall population to FTE ratio of 266.
- With a population of England & Wales at 54,072,000, divided by 143,725 FTE officers (as at March 2009) delivers a ratio of 376 citizens per FTE officer.
- The greatest burden of policing falls upon the front line response officers.
- A comparison of population to ALL Full Time Equivalent officers is worthless, as so many of those officers are not likely to be available to respond to the immediate demands and needs of the general public.
- A more realistic comparison is to measure the population against the numbers of officers designated as response.
- The most startling discovery therefore, as the dataset on page 22 illustrates, is that each of the 60,181 response officers identified earlier in the analysis, shoulders the burden of responsibility for **898 members of the public – over twice that suggested by the Home Office.**

On the page that follows, we will summarise the findings and conclusions drawn from this analysis.

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & OBSERVATIONS

There is considerable evidence to support widespread front line police officer belief that police response numbers are dramatically and dangerously lower than the Home Office and Senior Police Officers would have us believe.

The words of Gadget, Copperfield, Bloggs and many, many more, echo and reverberate with a distinct ring of truth, repeatedly pricking the conscience of anyone who would care to listen. Copperfield was among the first to raise his head above the parapet five or six years ago, venting a well intentioned frustration with the malaise that had crept into his beloved police service. Many thousands of front liners have since joined the throngs of protesting anonymous voices who desperately want to raise public awareness, so that pressure may be brought to bear in circles where positive influence may influence reforms in the police force that are long overdue.

Police response numbers, the poor application of financial and human resource is one of many areas of policing that require urgent reform. The ability to respond to the needs of the public is of paramount importance in the quest to restore ailing confidence in the service as a whole. More importantly, whilst the need for reform in this vital area remains obstructed by bureaucratic nonsense and a misguided drive to manipulate statistics, the lives and safety of both public and police are placed at risk. There have been too many sad examples with fatal consequences, where lives could have saved or protected more effectively, had reforms been implemented sooner.

Here is an extract from the Hansard minutes, which are a record of questions asked in the Commons on 20th Apr 2009 :


Police: Finance Sarah Teather: To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department how much the Department has allocated for promotion of and publicity for its policing pledge.

Mr. Woolas: The total amount of money allocated to the promotion of and publicity for the policing pledge during the financial year 2008-09 is **£3,427,521.**

This expenditure covers:

- Radio advertising
- National and regional press advertising
- Online advertising and online search marketing
- High street posters

We observed in an article on our site <http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com> that this money would have been better spent on front line police resources.



The £3.5 million spent promoting the "Pledge" and the many millions more that will be spent auditing forces and officers on its implementation is wasteful. It would have been a far better use of the budget to put 131 more coppers on the street than bombarding the public with more spin and promises. Action NOT words restore public confidence.

A copy of the Policing Pledge is at Appendix D and the end of this report.

Our point in raising the "Policing Pledge" is to highlight the fact that a large burden of responsibility for delivery of its core promises falls upon with the police response teams around the country. We see front line officer comments on a daily basis of repeated failure to deliver on the promises contained within the pledge. Unless and until the focus shifts back to putting more of the existing resources into response activity, the pledge will serve only to create false expectations that, when continually dashed, will deplete rather than improve the holy grail of public confidence.

CONCLUDING SUMMARY

- Of the 144, 469 FTE officers returned by the FOI requests, at best, 60,181 officers, just 42% are committed to response activity.
- From evidence disclosed by the forces, the more realistic number is in the region of 30% - 43,341 officers.
- Divide that number by four to account for shift patterns and rest days, leaves 10,835 officers to police a population in excess of 54 million.
- Factor in annual leave of 25 days per annum per officer reduces the number still further.
- Factor in sickness at 3.7% and course attendance.
- Police officers are spending no more time on the street now than they were two years ago, despite a series of initiatives intended slash paperwork and get them out of stations.
- Home Office figures show that in 2007-08 officers spent just 13.8 per cent of their time on patrol, which does not include attending incidents, down from 15.3 per cent in 2004-05. That is the equivalent of one hour in an average eight-hour shift, or fewer than six in a 40-hour week.
- By contrast, officers spent more than a fifth of their time on paperwork (21.7 per cent), up from 18.4 per cent over the same period and the equivalent of more than eight hours in a 40-hour week.

Officers work in excess of their 8 hour shifts, often without paid overtime, just to get the job done. This is a sure sign that police response levels have reached critical point, when the delivery of good service is so totally dependant on the good will and commitment of the officers at the front line.

We feel it is most appropriate to leave the final words of this report to a serving frontline response officer, known to many as Inspector Gadget.

When the patrol arrives, the first thing he does is admit the whole thing. “Yep, I done it,” he says. “Nicci works there, innit, and she’s a bitch.” Nicci is his “partner” and they have had a row.

After a scuffle, the patrol arrest him on suspicion of criminal damage and he is taken to the station.

A relatively simple job, you might think. Not in the crazy world of British policing. Here’s a list of the paperwork required from the patrol:

- a full, handwritten, pocket notebook entry detailing the incident, the grounds for Mikey’s arrest and anything that he said about the incident;*
- a typed arrest statement containing exactly the same information, only in more detail;*
- a typed form requesting the release of CCTV tapes. We don’t need the CCTV, but must view it. If we don’t, Mikey’s lawyer will claim that it contains evidence exonerating his client of the offence that four people and the CCTV operator saw him commit and to which he has confessed;*
- a handwritten custody “search and booking-in” form;*
- a property sheet, listing the contents of his pockets;*
- a typed persistent offender form, containing the same information as the arrest statement;*
- a typed young offender form, containing the same information in another format;*
- a typed or verbal “update” for the computer log held by the control room;*
- a typed crime report, with the same information as in the notebook, arrest statement and young offender form, but with the details in different fields;*
- at least two manual of guidance forms for the case file, summarising all the above;*
- witness statements;*
- a check of all his previous convictions;*
- a witness statement from Beachtastic Breaks saying that Mikey did not have permission to smash its window;*
- an “intelligence report” about the incident;*
- a typed domestic violence form (because Nicci was mentioned) with all the same information again, and a complete risk assessment for her;*

- *the paperwork for Mikey's fingerprinting and DNA record, running into four pages;*
- *the custody record, which is at least ten pages long;*
- *the brick will have been seized as evidence: there will be forms and statements to be filled out for that;*
- *a typed "update" on the "night-time economy incident" diary sheets;*
- *a handwritten two-page form for the licensing officer, discussing where Mikey might have purchased the alcohol.*

There will also be a "control sample" of the broken glass, to prove it was that window that he smashed. We then take it to the sergeant, who looks at it and then fills out another huge tranche of forms and writing.

We collect all of this because we live in fear of Mikey saying in court: "I didn't do any of this. I just said I did because the police bullied me."

It's about worst-case scenario policing: every job we go to, we have to assume that it is going to go really bent at trial. This isn't a triple murder, it's a smashed window. A smashed window that Mikey has already admitted breaking.

We need paperwork. We need to know that the police are not fitting people up, or mistreating them in custody. We need to keep a close eye on domestic violence offenders. I don't know a single police officer who believes otherwise. But do we really need all of this?

From Perverting the Course of Justice by Inspector Gadget, published by Monday Books.

APPENDIX A

Police Functions

- (1) 1. ACPO and Directors - Operational** - Police officers of ACPO ranks and support staff at equivalent levels
- 2. ACPO and Directors - Operational Support** - Police officers of ACPO ranks and support staff at equivalent levels.
- 3. ACPO and Directors - Organisational Support** - Police officers of ACPO ranks and support staff at equivalent levels, e.g. finance director.
- (2) 1. Air - Operational** Police staff who are predominantly employed as pilots, ground crew, or air observers.
- 2. Air - Operational Support** - Police staff who are predominantly employed as support to pilots, ground crew, air observers or in administrative functions connected with air support.
- (3) 1. Asset Confiscation – Operational** - Staff who predominantly identify and seize assets from the proceeds of crime under the Drugs Trafficking Offences Act 1986, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984.
- (4) 3. Buildings – Organisational Support** - Staff who are predominantly employed on duties relating to the cleaning, maintenance, security and administration of police buildings, but not including staff employed as part of a contract. Include handymen, grounds maintenance and cleaners.
- (5) 1. Burglary – Operational** - Staff who predominantly investigate offences of burglary. Includes "Operation Bumblebee". Do not include analysts or administrative assistants.
- 2. Burglary – Operational Support** - Staff who predominantly support the investigation of offences of burglary. Include analysts or administrative assistants.
- (6) 3. Catering – Organisational Support** - Staff who are predominantly employed in the provision of catering facilities but not including catering staff employed as part of a contract.
- (7) 1. Child/Sex/Domestic – Operational** - Staff who predominantly investigate and resolve offences against children and/or cases of domestic violence involving any member of a family. Include those employed on Missing Persons.
- 2. Child/Sex/Domestic – Operational Support** - Staff who predominantly support the investigation and resolution of offences against children and/or cases of domestic violence involving any member of a family. Include those employed on Missing Persons. This category should include analysts and administrative assistants.
- (8) 1. CID – Operational** - Staff mainly employed in plain clothes for the investigation of crime and who are not part of a specialist unit. Staff who predominantly investigate crime (not including the National Crime Squad) and who are not shown under other specific squad headings. Include any specialist squads or units not specifically mentioned elsewhere e.g. Robbery, Major Crime Units, Car crime unit/Stolen vehicle squad etc. Do not include members of a squad set up on an ad-hoc basis to deal with a temporary or local problem. These should be included under their normal category.
- 2. CID – Operational Support** - Staff mainly employed in supporting those employed in plain clothes for the investigation of crime and who are not part of a specialist unit. Staff who predominantly support the investigation of crime (not including the National Crime Squad) and who are not shown under other specific squad headings. Staff mainly employed in the co-ordination of the policing of football matches (Football Liaison) and collating associated intelligence. Include any analysts or administrative assistants employed in specialist squads or units not specifically mentioned elsewhere e.g. Robbery, Major Crime Units, Car crime unit/Stolen vehicle squad etc. Do not include members of

a squad set up on an ad-hoc basis to deal with a temporary or local problem. These should be included under their normal category

3. CID – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed on administrative, clerical or other support duties on behalf of general CID, asset confiscation, burglary, drugs, fraud, stolen vehicles, vice or other permanent CID squads (not including National Crime Squad).

(9) 1. CID Aides/Trainee Investigators – Operational - Officers temporarily seconded to CID (8) but not those on short attachments for familiarisation or assessment purposes, i.e. permanent post within a unit occupied by a CID aide.

(10) 2. Communications – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance, research, development and administration of radio, telephone and communications networks.

3. Communications – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance, research, development and administration of radio, telephone and communications networks.

(11) 1. Community Safety/Relations – Operational - Staff who predominantly undertake community safety work, including community relations, schools liaison, crime reduction, youth offender teams, closed circuit television or visual aids unit. Staff who are predominantly employed as Crime Prevention/Crime Reduction or Architectural Liaison Officers, or dealing with repeat victimisation

2. Community Safety/Relations – Operational Support - Staff who predominantly support staff undertaking community safety work (including Crime Prevention/Crime Reduction and Architectural Liaison Officers). Include analysts and administrative assistants.

(12) 1. Complaints and Discipline – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed in the investigation and administration of complaints and discipline matters.

2. Complaints and Discipline – Operational Support - Staff who predominantly support those employed in the investigation and administration of complaints and discipline matters.

3. Complaints and Discipline – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration of complaints and discipline matters.

(13) 1. Control Room (Call Handlers) – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed as Control Room Operatives in either force or area control rooms including officers employed as telephonists. Do not include Staff who are predominantly employed in dealing with front office enquiries from the public (see 25).

2. Control Room (Call Handlers) – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed as Control Room Operatives in either force or area control rooms including officers employed as telephonists. Do not include Staff who are predominantly employed in dealing with front office enquiries from the public (see 25). Include CAD Controllers.

(14) 1. Coroner's Officer – Operational - Staff who are predominantly assigned to duties in connection with sudden deaths and inquests.

2. Coroner's Officer - Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly assigned to support duties in connection with sudden deaths and inquests.

(15) 3. Corporate Development - Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed within force or area inspection units, including quality assurance and similar functions. Staff who are predominantly employed in the collation of statistics within the force. Staff who are predominantly employed in research and development, operational and strategic planning and information and policy analysis units. This section does not include officers employed on research and development in connection with computers or communications (see 34).

(16) 1. Court Security – Operational - Staff who are predominantly assigned to security duties at magistrates' courts and the Crown Court.

(17) 2. Crime and Incident Management – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed on Crime Desks, Crime management units or in Identification Parade Suites.

3. Crime and Incident Management – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed on Crime Desks, Crime management units or in Identification Parade Suites.

(18) 1. Criminal Justice Units – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration, checking and processing of prosecution files including liaison with the Crown Prosecution Service and staff who are predominantly employed in the making of additional enquiries required to supplement the quality of files. Staff who are predominantly employed in the processing and administration of applications in connection with licensed premises, registered clubs and matters concerning betting, gaming and lotteries. Staff who are predominantly employed in the execution of warrants, service of summonses and dealing with general/routine enquiries.

2. Criminal Justice Units – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration, checking and processing of prosecution files including liaison with the Crown Prosecution Service and staff who are predominantly employed in the making of additional enquiries required to supplement the quality of files. Staff who are predominantly employed in the processing and administration of applications in connection with licensed premises, registered clubs and matters concerning betting, gaming and lotteries. Staff who are predominantly employed in the execution of warrants, service of summonses and dealing with general/routine enquiries.

3. Criminal Justice Units – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration, checking and processing of prosecution files including liaison with the Crown Prosecution Service and staff who are predominantly employed in the making of additional enquiries required to supplement the quality of files. Staff who are predominantly employed in dealing with the processing of fixed penalty tickets and the recovery of penalties. Staff who are predominantly assigned to liaison duties with magistrates' courts and the Crown Court. Also include those otherwise employed in Administrative Support Units.

(19) 3. Criminal Records Office – Organisational Support

Staff who are predominantly employed in maintaining the force Criminal Records Office including officers working in PNC units.

(20) 1. Custody - Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed as custody officers performing duties in accordance with PACE.

2. Custody - Operational Support - Gaolers, i.e. staff who are predominantly employed in looking after prisoners in police custody.

(21) 2. Departmental Heads – Operational Support - Staff designated Heads of more than one operational unit or department specified on this form, e.g. Superintendent - Operations.

3. Departmental Heads - Organisational Support - Officers with supervisory responsibility for more than one support department or unit.

(22) 1. Dogs – Operational - Dog handlers including those employed for general policing, drugs and explosive detection duties.

2. Dogs – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed within Dogs Sections other than dog handlers.

(23) 2. Drivers – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed on driving duties relating to the transportation of personnel and/or property but not including officers shown at 30 or 54.

(24) 1. Drugs – Operational - Staff who predominantly investigate of drug offences, including Staff who are predominantly assigned to the inspection of chemists' registers in connection with dangerous drugs but not including officers specifically assigned to asset confiscation duties (see 3).

(25) 1. Enquiry/Station – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed in dealing with front office enquiries from members of the public at any police station but excluding any officer who deals exclusively with property (see 45) or whose primary function is that of telephonist or radio controller (see 13).

(26) 3. Finance – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration of force finance.

(27) 1. Fingerprint/Photographic – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed as Fingerprint Officers or employed in a Fingerprint Bureau; and Staff who are predominantly employed as photographers or in photographic laboratories. Do not include Scenes of Crime Officers (see 47).

2. Fingerprint/Photographic – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly support Fingerprint Officers or photographers. Do not include Scenes of Crime Officers (see 47).

(28) 1. Firearms - Tactical – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed in the use of firearms either as tactical advisors, trainers or in the provision of firearms support to operational incidents. Officers employed in Armed Response Vehicles should only be included if they are mainly employed within the Force Firearms Unit as described above. Officers employed in Armed Response Vehicles but not employed within the Force Firearms Unit should be shown within their regular deployment category.

(29) 2. Firearms/Explosives – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the processing of applications and in making enquiries for firearm and shotgun certificates, renewals, rejections, appeals and firearms surrendered to police custody, or in connection with the licensing and security of explosives and explosives stores.

(30) 1. Foot/Car/Beat Patrol – Operational - The ACPO Working Group on Patrol settled on the definition: "The overt presence, whether on foot or mobile, of a locally accountable uniformed police constable who provides public reassurance and who is approachable and available to ensure an appropriate response from all the resources of the police service, to the needs and demands of the general public". Thus, include staff who are predominantly assigned to operational patrol in uniform either on foot, on a pedal/motor cycle or in a motor vehicle (includes 'Home Beat', etc). Also include Task force/support group/territorial patrol. Do not include traffic and motorway patrol (see 54) and members of dogs' sections (see 22). Officers of supervisory rank who perform patrol duties, e.g. shift supervisors, should be included. Local beat/home beat officers should be included. Specials should be included. Do not include recruits undergoing training on modules 1 - 7 (see 46).

(31) 1. Fraud – Operational - Staff who predominantly investigate fraud cases. Do not include staff who are predominantly employed in asset confiscation duties (see 3).

2. Fraud – Operational Support - Staff who predominantly employed to support the investigation of fraud cases. Do not include staff who are predominantly employed in asset confiscation duties (see 3).

(32) 1. Hate Crime - Operational - Staff mainly employed in the investigation of hate crime, including race and homophobic incidents.

2. Hate Crime - Operational Support - Staff mainly employed in supporting those employed in the investigation of hate crime, including race and homophobic incidents.

3. Hate Crime - Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed on administrative, clerical or other support duties on behalf of those employed in the investigation of hate crime, including race and homophobic incidents.

(33) 2. HOLMES Unit – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in duties connected with the operational use of HOLMES. Officers employed as full time HOLMES Training Instructors should not be included in this section (see 56).

(34) 2. IT/Communications/Audio – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance, research, development and administration of computer or telecommunications systems.

3. IT/Communications/Audio – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance, research, development and administration of computer or telecommunications systems.

(35) 1. Intelligence – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed in criminal intelligence units including Field Intelligence Officers and Local Intelligence Officers and staff who are predominantly employed in the co-ordination of the policing of football matches and collating associated intelligence.

2. Intelligence – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in criminal intelligence units including Field Intelligence Officers and Local Intelligence Officers. Other staff who maintain indices and records for criminal intelligence purposes should also be included.

3. Intelligence – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in criminal intelligence units including Field Intelligence Officers and Local Intelligence Officers. Other staff who maintain indices and records for criminal intelligence purposes should also be included.

(36) 1. Local Commanders – Operational - Operational local commanders and their deputies (Basic Command Units or equivalent)

(37) 1. Marine – Operational - Staff who predominantly conduct marine or boat patrol including supervisors. Members of Underwater Search Units should be shown at 56.

2. Marine – Operational Support - Staff who predominantly perform support functions within Marine Sections/Units. Members of Underwater Search Units should be shown at 57.

3. Marine – Organisational Support - Staff who predominantly perform support functions within Marine Sections/Units. Members of Underwater Search Units should be shown at 57.

(38) 1. Mounted – Operational - Staff who predominantly conduct mounted patrol duties, including supervisors.

2. Mounted – Operational Support - Officers in support roles within mounted units.

3. Mounted - Organisational Support - Staff in support roles within mounted units.

(39) 2. Operational Planning – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in planning operational events include those planning special events and contingency planning.

3. Operational Planning – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in planning operational events include those planning special events and contingency planning

(40) 3. Other Admin/Clerical – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed on administrative or clerical duties anywhere in the force not covered in other categories.

(41) 3. Personnel/Human Resources – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in personnel/career development and management, equal opportunities and diversity, including associated administrative support. Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration and management of recruiting personnel to the force.

(42) 2. Plan Drawing – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the production of plans for court or other purposes.

(43) 1. Ports – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed at sea or airports on general policing and security duties, excluding protection staff (see 48).

2. Ports - Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed at sea or airports to support general policing and security duties, excluding protection staff (see 48).

3. Ports - Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed at sea or airports to support general policing and security duties, excluding protection staff (see 48).

(44) 3. Press and Public Relations – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in media relations and publicity about the force. Include press officers

(45) 2. Property – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration, retention and disposal of property coming into police possession.

(46) 1. Recruits Modules 1 - 7 – Operational - Officers being trained under Modules 1 - 7 (or equivalent in the Metropolitan Police).

(47) 1. Scenes of Crime – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed in providing scientific support including Scenes of Crime Officers, their supervisors and those engaged in administrative duties relating thereto. Do not include staff who are predominantly employed in connection with Fingerprints and Photographs (see 27).

2. Scenes of Crime – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in providing scientific support including Scenes of Crime Officers, their supervisors and those engaged in administrative duties relating thereto. Do not include staff who are predominantly employed in connection with Fingerprints and Photographs (see 27).

(48) 1. Special Branch/Protection/Immigration/Nationality – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed on Special Branch duties including officers posted to Units situated at ports. Staff who are predominantly employed in the protection of persons or property, excluding staff at ports e.g. armed patrol/counter terrorists (see 43).

2. Special Branch/Protection/Immigration/Nationality – Operational Support - Administration staff who are predominantly employed in Special Branch units including ports units. Staff permanently employed in the registration of foreign nationals and the conduct of naturalisation enquiries other than Special Branch Officers. Administration staff who are predominantly employed in providing administrative support for staff employed in the protection of persons or property but excluding staff at ports (see 43).

3. Special Branch/Protection/Immigration/Nationality -Organisational Support - Administration staff who are predominantly employed in Special Branch units including ports units. Staff permanently employed in the registration of foreign nationals and the conduct of naturalisation enquiries other than Special Branch Officers. Administration staff who are predominantly employed in providing administrative support for staff employed in the protection of persons or property but excluding staff at ports (see 43).

(49) 3. Staff Associations – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in Staff Association work.

(50) 3. Staff Officers – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed as Staff Officers to Senior Command within the force.

(51) 3. Stores/Supplies – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration and handling of stores/supplies.

(52) 1. Surveillance Unit – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed on surveillance duties.

2. Surveillance Unit – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed on surveillance duties.

(53) 1. Technical Support Unit – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance and installation of technical support equipment.

2. Technical Support Unit – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance and installation of technical support equipment.

(54) 1. Traffic – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed on motor-cycles or in patrol vehicles for the policing of traffic and motorway related duties. This does not include officers employed in accident investigation, vehicle examination and radar duties.

2. Traffic – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed to support the traffic function of the force including radar, accident investigation, vehicle examination and traffic administration. Include officers working with hazardous chemicals.

3. Traffic – Organisational Support - Administrative staff predominantly serving the internal needs of the traffic function of the force.

(55) 1. Traffic Wardens – Operational - Traffic Wardens engaged in patrol and other duties.

2. Traffic Wardens - Operational Support - Staff (including Senior Traffic Wardens) who are predominantly employed in the supervision of Traffic Wardens, otherwise than on patrol.

3. Traffic Wardens - Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in administrative duties connected with Traffic Warden Units.

(56) 2. Training – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the training and instruction of other officers including training management, force training school instructors, divisional training officers, public order trainers, driving school instructors, detective training instructors, HOLMES training instructors, physical training instructors and officers employed in training administration. Do not include officers employed in Firearms Training (see 28).

3. Training – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the training and instruction of other officers including training management, force training school instructors, divisional training officers, public order trainers, driving school instructors, detective training instructors, HOLMES training instructors, physical training instructors and officers employed in training administration. Do not include officers employed in Firearms Training (see 28).

(57) 1. Underwater – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed in an Underwater Search Unit but not including officers employed in Marine Units (see 37).

(58) 1. Vehicle Crime – Operational - Staff who are predominantly assigned to the investigation of theft of or from motor vehicles.

(59) 2. Vehicle Workshops/Fleet – Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the administration and maintenance of the Force vehicle fleet.

(60) 1. Vice – Operational - Staff who are predominantly employed in the investigation of offences relating to obscene publications and prostitution.

2. Vice - Operational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed in the investigation of offences relating to obscene publications and prostitution.

(61) 3. Welfare - Occupational Health and Welfare – Organisational Support - Staff who are predominantly employed as welfare officers, occupational health Officers, nurses and Force Medical Officers.

(62) 1. Other - Operational

2. Other - Operational Support

3. Other - Organisational Support

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

APPENDIX B

USEFUL INFORMATION - FORCE FOI RETURNS



Police Forces of England & Wales

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

USEFUL INFORMATION - FORCE FOI RETURNS

CAUTIONARY NOTE:

Whilst not uncooperative, many of the forces displayed a concern that their data should not be misinterpreted. A common rider paragraph, accompanying data makes the statement that data collection from force to force is not generic and caution should be applied when using the data for comparative purposes.

For this reason, we have taken considerable care when examining the data from each force and drilling it down from gross operational figures to net response numbers.

Nice 1 Limited can accept no responsibility for any misinterpretation that might be placed upon the findings contained within this report or for the actions or reporting by any third party that may misrepresent any statement made herein.

The full FOI responses received, together with our extensive calculation spreadsheets collating and presenting the data, will be made available on receipt of a written request to the company.

1. **Avon & Somerset** – Return contained the rider *“The definition of response is open to interpretation and therefore the Home Office guidance indicators have been used which details the areas deemed to be frontline”*. Within their submission was a list of functions considered operational, including the section 30 defined response category for Foot/Car/Beat Patrol with a count of 1602 officers.
2. **Bedfordshire** – Response contained: *“As at 31/12/09, Bedfordshire had a total of 1181 Police Officers who were assigned as Operational with a further 69 who were on Operational Support duties. Operational police officers who were assigned specifically against subsection “Foot/Car/Beat Patrol” (Response duties) totalled 318”*
3. **Cambridgeshire** – Response contained: *“1458 officers were designated as ‘responsive’ officers by nature of their employment”*. (the Force strength is 1458, so they were stating that every officer would be classed as response, which cannot be the case in practice. With full credit to the arresting officers, just it takes more than one egg to make an omelet, it takes more than a couple of arrests to warrant categorizing an officer function as “response”). Their response went on to say: *“This is because a department is not regarded as being either ‘responsive’ or ‘non-responsive’ since all departments within the constabulary will respond to the demands of the present situation. All officers are required to maintain full competency to carry out response duties at all times; this can be best illustrated by the recent arrests made by our Head of Learning & Development (Superintendent) and also by our Assistant Chief Constable; both roles which may otherwise be considered as administrative”*. Total numbers entered into first dataset, adjusted for the second set in line with the highest numbers recorded by the Home Office comparable forces.

4. **Cheshire** – Provided detailed 354 line spreadsheet detailing the operational, operational support and organisational support functions and numbers for each. From this we were able to identify the response numbers and enter them into the dataset. Initial examination included 1419 officers. When cross referenced with the H.O. functions list the actual number of officers fitting the S30 definition was 742, so this figure was entered in the adjusted dataset.
5. **City of London** – No response to FOI request
6. **Cleveland** – Response contained: *“The total number of police officers assigned to response duties as at 31st December 2009 across the four districts was 457.25 FTE. However, please note that this is the total number of officers specifically assigned to a response policing shift. If you are looking for the number of police officers assigned to front line / operational policing duties then this will not reflect that, as it does not include NPT, NST, DSU, Traffic, Dog section, Armed response, Air Support, crime etc”*. 457 entered in both datasets as the response number.
7. **Cumbria** - Response contained: *“Uniform Operational (Includes Patrol Officers, Roads Policing Unit, Tactical Support Group, Dog Section). = 833 officers Inspector & below. This number entered in first dataset, then revised to 681 in the adjusted set, to deduct the non response definitions, on the basis of the highest comparable force.*
8. **Derbyshire** – Response contained: *“The number of officers who were assigned “response” duties which fall completely into your clarification is 1,105. There is however a narrowness of your clarification which would not include such posts as front line CID, collision investigation, Air observation, public protection, incident handling / operations centres and many others so for comparative purposes our response may not equate to any other force response and should therefore not be used for such a purpose as it would likely be misleading”*. 1105 was entered into both datasets. No breakdown of officer function was provided, preventing confirmation that this number fell entirely within the definition 30 response function. This figure may be overstated.
9. **Devon & Cornwall** – Response contained: *“Response Officers’ has been taken to mean those officers in dedicated teams such as Community Beat Officers, Safer Neighbourhood teams or Targeted Patrol Teams. There may be local variations on this, which will mean they won't have been picked up on the search. However, the Human Resources Department have stated that this is unlikely and that the above is a very good representation of what has been requested”*. Contained a return of 1,781 officers Inspector downwards entered into both datasets. No breakdown of officer function was provided, preventing confirmation of the category 30 response numbers, therefore this figure remains overstated.
10. **Dorset** - Response contained: *“In order to clarify the meaning of 'Response' it is a definition used by HMIC (Her majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary) it is a subset of frontline policing and is generally considered to refer to those on foot, car or beat patrol. These categories have recently been subdivided further into 'response' and safer neighbourhood”*. The total figure of 670 was entered into the first dataset, then adjusted to 527 for the second set on examination of the return which specified 527 response : 143 Safer neighbourhood.
11. **Durham** - Response contained: *“Please find the following table that breaks down the total number of Durham Constabulary’s Response Duty Officers by rank as at 31/12/2009. Please note that the term “Response Duty Officers” relates to those officers whose duties include responding to incidents and calls from the public”*. The table included 3 ACPO Officers, 3 Chief Superintendents, 5 Superintendents, 10 Chief Inspectors, 67 Inspectors, 205 Sergeants & 1145 constables, producing their submitted response total of 1435. Whilst this figure was entered into the first “actual” dataset, it is clearly misleading. The figure was

adjusted for the second dataset to 838, to reflect the highest percentage response resource of its comparable forces from the Home Office list. This figure is likely to be overstated.

12. Dyfed – Powys - No response to FOI request

13. **Essex** – Response contained: *“I am not sure what you mean by "response" duties but Essex Police publishes details of staffing in a report "Workforce Monitoring" which can be found at the following link: <<http://www.essex.police.uk/pdf/eqsumrep....>> <http://www.essex.police.uk/pdf/eqsumrep....> For the purpose of section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA), this part of my response serves as a formal notification of refusal of your request on the basis that the exemption given at section 21 of the FOIA applies (Information accessible by other means). I hope the information provided is of use.* The least useful of information provided in the format delivered. The only discernable data that could be extracted was the total force strength which was known anyway. The response merely referred us to the Essex Police Workforce Monitoring Report 0809, which they stated included all the information we would require. It did not. It contained page after page about ethnicity and gender, and numbers of officers assigned to various divisions, but no categories were provided. For this reason, only the force strength was entered on the first dataset. For the second dataset, the highest comparable force was used to provide the estimation of operational and resource numbers, both of which are likely to be overstated.
14. **Gloucestershire** – Response contained: *“There were 545 Police Officers assigned to response duties. Please note that the figures above have been grouped as per Home Office designated categories of Foot/Car/Beat Patrol (HMIC Function 30) and those that are deployed in Traffic (HMIC Function 54) roles as being response duties”.* This followed a strength list by officer. Whilst this produced a comparatively high response of 40%, this figure was left in both datasets. It includes non response categories of officer (Traffic function 54), so we would advise this figure may be overstated.
15. **Greater Manchester** – In response to the request for “response” numbers GMP merely included a table of operational officers (see below), which includes a large proportion of non response officers, devaluing the submission. Taking the Inspector to Constable operational numbers produced 7139 which was entered into the actual dataset. Clearly this was grossly overstating the response numbers. The figure was adjusted in line with the highest comparable force to a figure of 4067 for the adjusted set. We would advise this figure is likely to be overstated.

Rank	HMI Classification			
	Operational	Operational Support	Organisational Support	All Roles
Chief Constable	1			1
Assistant Chief Constable	5			5
Chief Superintendent	15	4		19
Superintendent	45	6	3	54
Chief Inspector	80	14	5	99
Inspector	271	59	30	360
Sergeant	1005	131	29	1165
Constable	5863	653	80	6596

16. Gwent - No response to FOI request

17. **Hampshire** – Response contained: *“The Home Office classification for ‘response’, is defined as follows: “Staff who are predominantly assigned to 24/7 response policing, include task force/support group/territorial patrol. Do not include traffic and motorway patrol (see traffic) and members of dogs sections (see Dogs). Include officers of supervisory rank who perform patrol duties, e.g. shift supervisors. NB – This does not include Neighbourhood Policing Teams.” Therefore At 31/12/2009: 1404.3 FTE officers were assigned to roles classed as ‘response’ according to the Home Office definition. 1404 entered in both sets.*

18. **Hertfordshire** – This force provided a two page list of officers by rank ops, ops support or org support category and department. From this we entered the operational figure in the first dataset. We arrived at the response number and percentage by use of the comparative force model.
19. **Humberside** – Response contained: *“Attached to Divisions/Operational Branches = 2040 (above excluding those attached to non operational Branches). Out of a force strength disclosed of 2112, this produced a response percentage of 97%. Whilst this was entered in the first actual dataset, it was clearly overstated. Using the highest comparable force method, an adjusted figure of 718 (34%) was entered in the adjusted dataset.*
20. **Kent**– Response contained: *“To a certain degree this information is not held by Kent Police, as there are no ‘non response’ officers employed by the force. All officers assigned to roles in which they are not routinely required to respond to public calls are still required to deal with incidents and carry out frontline duties at need, unless they have been assigned to restricted duties. However it is possible to provide the number of officers employed in various roles and I have detailed these below. Response Officers and Patrol : 1347”.* This number was entered in both datasets.
21. **Lancashire - No response to FOI request**
22. **Leicestershire** – Response contained: *“Please note, that for the purposes of this request, Response is all Officers stationed at Local Policing Units (LPUs). This includes the LPU Commander, the Shift and Neighbourhood Sergeants, LPOs, PBOs, Student Officers, Neighbourhood Action Teams etc. All other Officers I have interpreted as being Non – Response. I’ve interpreted this as the financial year 2009-2010 and have provided the latest information available. There will be a small amount of fluctuation from the end of 2009, but not a significant change to shape or size of the organisation. Number of Officers assigned to Response Duties – 1298”* This figure entered in both datasets, but it must be understood that the figure is overstated in terms of pure response officers, as it includes neighbourhood, action teams, student officers etc.
23. **Lincolnshire** – Response contained: *“As at 31 December 2009 there were 868 police officers undertaking response officer roles”* 868 entered in the first dataset, however this was a very high return at 72%, so we applied the most comparable force model, producing 649 (64%) for the adjusted set.
24. **Merseyside - No response to FOI request**
25. **Metropolitan** – The Met provided a detailed list comprising an 83 line spreadsheet with officer numbers sorted by rank and operational, operational support and organisational support. We examined the list line by line and compared it to the descriptions on the Met website and the Home Office function list. We arrived at a figure of 13,621 response officers based on the information provided and entered this in both datasets. However, the list, whilst detailed in terms of categories and divisions, did not specify Home Office functions, so it is highly likely that 13,621 is overstated.
26. **Norfolk** – The force provided a breakdown by rank and department which initially provided a figure under the label County Delivery Unit of 923. However, when cross referencing this with the force website, it confirmed that within the CDU the response team numbered 500. This figure was therefore entered in both datasets.
27. **North Wales** - Response Contained: *“609 constables and 120 sergeants assigned solely to response duties. It should be noted however, that designated response officers are not the only policing resource that will attend incidents. The force maintains some degree of flexibility which allows officers from other departments/units to respond to incidents as and when required. These officers include personnel from Neighbourhood policing teams, Conflict*

Management Unit, Roads policing, Air support, Dog section, pro-active units and many others”. The figure of 729 for response was entered in both datasets.

- 28. **North Yorkshire** – Response contained: “At any point 343 actual Response Officers” This number entered in both datasets.
- 29. **Northamptonshire** – Response contained: “Officers assigned to Response Duties as at 31st December 2009 = 647 FTE. Response duties classed as: Incident Resolution Teams, Dog Teams, Drugs Team, Specialist Crime Response Teams, Safer Community Teams, Operational Tactical Units (Firearms and Traffic), East Midlands Air Support (Helicopter)”. 647 entered in both datasets, though clearly from the text this is overstated.
- 30. **Northumbria** – Response contained “Officers assigned to response duties : Insp 100, Sgt 355, PC 2275”. Clearly, this was grossly overstated, as the total force strength is 4,102, to reflect a response level of 2,730 (67%) threw the force way out of alignment with comparable forces. We entered the 2730 in the non adjusted dataset, then applied the highest comparative force percentage to enter a response number of 2010 in the adjusted set. Again, without more detail from the force, we are of the opinion that this is likely to be overstated.
- 31. **Nottinghamshire** – Response contained: “816 Response Officers” This number entered in both datasets.
- 32. **South Wales** – Response contained: “2646 as at 31st December 2009” Clearly, this was grossly overstated, as the total force strength is 3,163, to reflect a response level of 2,646 (84%) threw the force way out of alignment with comparable forces. We entered the 2,646 in the non adjusted dataset, then applied the highest comparative force percentage to enter a response number of 1518 (48%) in the adjusted set. Again, without more detail from the force, we are of the opinion that this is likely to be overstated.
- 33. **South Yorkshire** – Response contained: “934 officers were assigned to respond to incidents in 2009”. This number entered in both datasets.
- 34. **Staffordshire** – Response contained: “These categories are what are provided to HMIC. Operational would include Response, Neighbourhood Policing, Dogs, Firearms, and CID. 'Operational' would be roles that support the Operational officers and Organisational Support are more 'Administerial' positions. We would not normally provide specific information concerning the breakdown of individual departments and numbers of officers”. Force provided a summary table only (below), so the 1977 Operational figure was inserted into the first dataset for response producing an 89% ratio, which is considered unrealistic. In the second adjusted set, the highest comparable force percentage was inserted, producing 1,106 (50%).

		Job Family			
Employee Category	Data	Operational	Operational Support	Organisational Support	Grand Total
Police	Count of Employee	2011	191	51	2253
	Full Time Equivalent	1976.92	184.85	48.83	2210.6
Total Count of Employee		2011	191	51	2253
Total Full Time Equivalent		1976.92	184.85	48.83	2210.6

- 35. **Suffolk** – Force provided a series of tables, including the one shown to the right, which reflects an operational count and a gross response count inclusive of neighbourhood that would not normally be included. The 696 figure was inserted in both the first dataset and the adjusted dataset, but as this contains neighbourhood numbers, it is overstated.

Operational	1,256.33 (including 695.58 Safer Neighbourhood / Response Officers and 58 student officers)
Operational Support	28.69
Organisational Support	6

36. **Surrey** – Response contained: see text inserted below. Perhaps the best response of all the forces, with a colour coded spreadsheet displaying a thorough understanding of the questions asked and replying with sufficient detail, completely avoiding some of the forces tendencies to inflate or overstate their position. From the data provided, the response numbers of 432 (23%) are thought to be an accurate reflection, that is possibly the best indicator of the likely response ratios for forces. The only deduction from these figures might be the annual leave, rest days and sickness.

A1- 4. We have provided you with a response in the form of a spread sheet (please see attached). The spreadsheet provides the total number of officers at each rank broken down into departments. It is not possible to provide an accurate picture to show which role would be office based or response based as some involve both. However, I have colour coded the spreadsheet to give an idea of which roles are likely to be more focused on response duties, or administration, and also the ones which may involve both.

37. **Sussex** – As can be seen from the table below, Sussex force have incorporated Neighbourhood Teams within their response count. However, the FTE number has been inserted into both the actual and adjusted datasets, with the comment that this figure is overstated as a response number and percentage.

2. How many of those officers were assigned to response duties in 2009			
All Officers in Neighbourhood Response Teams (NRT) as at 31/12/2009			
Headcount		Full Time Equivalent	
Rank/Grade	Total	Rank/Grade	Total
06 - Chief Inspector	1	06 - Chief Inspector	1.00
07 - Inspector	32	07 - Inspector	32.00
08 - Sergeant	135	08 - Sergeant	134.64
09 - Police Constable	906	09 - Police Constable	890.25
Grand Total	1074	Grand Total	1057.89

38. **Thames Valley** – Response contained: *“I have interpreted your request for "Response Duty" Officers to refer to those officers with roles which involve routine and immediate communication/interface with the public. In 2009, there were 1187 officers assigned to such a role. Any police officer of whatever rank may be required to respond to an incident or emergency situation dependent on their experience, availability and expertise. Therefore, we would classify all police officers as "Response Officers" within that definition”*. The 1187 number submitted as a response figure was entered on both datasets, but it is clear that to some extent, this is overstated as the force has not restricted the count to response as per the section 30 Home Office definition.

39. **Warwickshire** – Response contained: *“Number of Response Officers (i.e. any officer available to respond and attend to calls from the general public as opposed to officers whose functions do not usually include such response activity) – 491”*. The 491 figure quoted was entered on both datasets. Again it seems it clear that to some extent, this is overstated as the force has not restricted the count to response as per the section 30 Home Office definition.

40. **West Mercia** - Response contained: *“There were 1366 officers based on HMI codes 30 and 54”* Code 30 is correct as a response, code 54 relates to traffic officers, which is not strictly a response function. If we look again at the response from Hampshire *“The Home Office classification for ‘response’, is defined as follows: “Staff who are predominantly assigned to 24/7 response policing, include task force/support group/territorial patrol. Do not include traffic and motorway patrol (see traffic)”* It is clear that there is a lack of consistency in the interpretation of the Home Office guidelines from force to force. Again 1366 was entered in both datasets but it should be noted that this is overstated.

41. West Midlands – The force kindly supplied a useful table. The only line that falls directly into the response category is Neighbourhood Policing which is an umbrella title incorporating the response only numbers. (Neighbourhood support are PCSO’s as per the West Midlands website). The line 2 entry was inserted in both datasets, again with the observation that this figure is still overstated (at 21%) as it includes neighbourhood policing teams that would not ordinarily be considered as response).

Duty	Rank							Total
	ACPO	Ch Supt	Supt	Ch Insp	Insp	Sgt	Con	
Neighbourhood Support				1	74	246	2,094	2,415
Neighbourhood Policing				1	44	212	1,574	1,831
Crime Support/CID		1	8	35	83	263	1,459	1,849
Operations			1	5	13	47	289	355
RPU/Motorway					2	24	319	345
Ops Centres					16	65	255	336
Public Protection Unit				6	15	44	234	299
Community Safety					14	30	170	214
Custody					1	121	18	140
Training					6	17	114	137
Dogs					1	5	70	76
Glidewell/CJU					4	16	52	72
Command Team	7	4	7	7	27	4	15	71
Seconded		4	1	1	7	8	17	38
Organisational & Organisational Support ¹		22	28	11	69	69	371	570
Total	7	31	45	67	376	1,171	7,051	8,748

42. West Yorkshire – A useful table was submitted by this force as can be seen below. The text below the table shows the force has chosen to interpret response to include neighbourhood policing, traffic and dog sections. Feedback from front line officers across the country confirms that whilst this may be the intended principle on paper, in practice, dog and traffic officers do not respond to calls from the public with the same frequency as the dedicated response foot or car patrols. We have inserted the 2480 response line figure in both datasets, again with the statement that this is overstated.

2. How many of those officers were assigned to response duties in 2009

Officers posted to:	ACPO	CH SUPT	SUPT	CH INSP	INSP	SGT	CONST	TOTAL
Response Duties*				1	93	291	2095	2480
Operational**	6	18	39	71	179	481	2397	3191
Total	6	18	39	72	272	772	4492	5671

*Please note that the "Response Duties" category includes officers in response teams, neighbourhood policing teams, traffic roles, and dog sections who would provide the initial response to calls from the public.

**Officers in the "Operational" category carry out roles which prevent and investigate crimes and incidents but they do not usually provide an initial response to calls from the public. This category includes divisional crime investigation officers, intelligence gathering officers, specialist crime teams, counter terrorist officers, firearms officers and call handling officers.

43. Wiltshire – In response to the question “How many of those officers were assigned to response duties in 2009?” the force replied : *“It must be noted that ALL officers are operational unless they are downgraded for medical reasons and would be deployed if the situation dictated. However there are 558 officers that could be classed as being assigned to response duties”*. The blanket answer, without supporting officer numbers, functions etc, enables the force to wriggle the response number upwards, as we suspect has happened here. We have entered the 558 in both datasets, but would state that we believe this figure is overstated.

Note : In hindsight, now that we are aware of the section 30 definition, this will be requested in any future requests to forces.

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

APPENDIX C - HOW THE HOME OFFICE COMPARE FORCES ANALYSIS OF POLICING AND COMMUNITY SAFETY (APACS) PERFORMANCE

The Home Office and Her Majesties Inspector of Constabulary conduct regular inspections of all the police forces of England & Wales. In the process of these inspections, it is often useful to draw comparisons between forces. To ensure an “apples with apples” comparison is drawn, forces are compared in terms of officer strength, geographical considerations such as land mass, population figures, crime levels and a number of social and economic factors. By clicking the link to the site below, each force was checked and its respective comparable force identified. This was found to be useful when examining the FOI submissions from each force.

<http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/performance-and-measurement/performance-assessment/apacs-2008-2009/index.html>

Police Force	http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/performance-and-measurement/performance-assessment/apacs-2008-2009/index.html							
Avon & Somerset	often compared with:	Essex	Hertfordshire	Kent	Hampshire	Cambridgeshire	Devon & Cornwall	Thames Valley
Bedfordshire	often compared with:	Hertfordshire	Sussex	Hampshire	Essex	Thames Valley	Kent	Avon & Somerset
Cambridgeshire	often compared with:	Devon & Cornwall	Gloucestershire	Wiltshire	Avon & Somerset	Warwickshire	Essex	Kent
Cheshire	often compared with:	Staffordshire	Northamptonshire	Warwickshire	Suffolk	Wiltshire	Gloucestershire	Devon & Cornwall
Cleveland	often compared with:	Northumbria	Merseyside	South Yorkshire	South Wales	West Midlands	Gwent	
Cumbria	often compared with:	North Wales	Derbyshire	Norfolk	Suffolk	Staffordshire	Cheshire	Durham
Derbyshire	often compared with:	Cumbria	North Wales	Durham	Norfolk	Staffordshire	Humberside	Suffolk
Devon & Cornwall	often compared with:	Cambridgeshire	Gloucestershire	Warwickshire	Wiltshire	Avon & Somerset	Essex	Kent
Dorset	often compared with:	Surrey	Thames Valley	Hampshire	Sussex			
Durham	often compared with:	Humberside	Gwent	Derbyshire	South Wales	South Yorkshire	Nottinghamshire	Cumbria
Dyfed-Powys	often compared with:	Lincolnshire	Norfolk	North Wales				
Essex	often compared with:	Avon & Somerset	Kent	Hertfordshire	Hampshire	Leicestershire	Devon & Cornwall	Cambridgeshire
Gloucestershire	often compared with:	Wiltshire	Warwickshire	Devon & Cornwall	Cambridgeshire	West Mercia	North Yorkshire	Cheshire
Greater Manchester	often compared with:	West Yorkshire	West Midlands	Northumbria	Merseyside	South Yorkshire		
Gwent	often compared with:	Humberside	Durham	South Yorkshire	South Wales	Cleveland		
Hampshire	often compared with:	Sussex	Hertfordshire	Thames Valley	Bedfordshire	Essex	Avon & Somerset	Kent
Hertfordshire	often compared with:	Hampshire	Sussex	Bedfordshire	Essex	Avon & Somerset	Thames Valley	Kent
Humberside	often compared with:	Durham	Gwent	Derbyshire	South Yorkshire	South Wales	Nottinghamshire	
Kent	often compared with:	Leicestershire	Essex	Lancashire	Avon & Somerset	Hertfordshire	Devon & Cornwall	Bedfordshire
Lancashire	often compared with:	Leicestershire	Kent	Nottinghamshire	West Yorkshire	Essex	Northamptonshire	Hertfordshire
Leicestershire	often compared with:	Kent	Lancashire	Essex	Northamptonshire	Nottinghamshire	Avon & Somerset	Devon & Cornwall
Lincolnshire	often compared with:	Dyfed Powys	Norfolk	North Wales	Suffolk			
London, City of	often compared with:	None						
Merseyside	often compared with:	West Midlands	Cleveland	Northumbria	Greater Manchester			
Metropolitan Police	often compared with:	Greater Manchester	West Yorkshire	West Midlands				
Norfolk	often compared with:	North Wales	Cumbria	Lincolnshire	Dyfed Powys	Suffolk	Derbyshire	North Yorkshire
North Wales	often compared with:	Cumbria	Norfolk	Derbyshire	Suffolk	Lincolnshire	Dyfed Powys	
North Yorkshire	often compared with:	West Mercia	Suffolk	Wiltshire	Warwickshire	Gloucestershire	Cheshire	Devon & Cornwall
Northamptonshire	often compared with:	Staffordshire	Cheshire	Nottinghamshire	Leicestershire	Warwickshire	Devon & Cornwall	Kent
Northumbria	often compared with:	South Yorkshire	South Wales	Cleveland	Nottinghamshire	Merseyside	Greater Manchester	West Midlands
Nottinghamshire	often compared with:	South Wales	South Yorkshire	Northamptonshire	Leicestershire	Lancashire	Staffordshire	Northumbria
South Wales	often compared with:	South Yorkshire	Nottinghamshire	Northumbria	Cleveland	Durham	Lancashire	Northamptonshire
South Yorkshire	often compared with:	South Wales	Northumbria	Nottinghamshire	Cleveland	Durham	Humberside	Lancashire
Staffordshire	often compared with:	Cheshire	Northamptonshire	Warwickshire	Nottinghamshire	Suffolk	Wiltshire	Gloucestershire
Suffolk	often compared with:	North Yorkshire	West Mercia	Warwickshire	Cheshire	Norfolk	Wiltshire	Cumbria
Surrey	often compared with:	Dorset	Thames Valley	Sussex				
Sussex	often compared with:	Hampshire	Hertfordshire	Thames Valley	Bedfordshire	Essex	Avon & Somerset	Kent
Thames Valley	often compared with:	Hampshire	Sussex	Hertfordshire	Avon & Somerset	Essex	Bedfordshire	Dorset
Warwickshire	often compared with:	Wiltshire	Gloucestershire	Devon & Cornwall	Cheshire	Cambridgeshire	North Yorkshire	West Mercia
West Mercia	often compared with:	North Yorkshire	Wiltshire	Suffolk	Warwickshire	Gloucestershire	Cambridgeshire	Devon & Cornwall
West Midlands	often compared with:	Greater Manchester	Merseyside	West Yorkshire	Northumbria	Cleveland		
West Yorkshire	often compared with:	Greater Manchester	Lancashire	West Midlands	Northumbria	Leicestershire	South Wales	South Yorkshire
Wiltshire	often compared with:	Gloucestershire	Warwickshire	West Mercia	North Yorkshire	Devon & Cornwall	Cambridgeshire	Cheshire

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

APPENDIX D - THE POLICING PLEDGE

POLICING PLEDGE



THE POLICE SERVICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES WILL SUPPORT LAW ABIDING CITIZENS AND PURSUE CRIMINALS RELENTLESSLY TO KEEP YOU AND YOUR NEIGHBOURHOODS SAFE FROM HARM. WE WILL:

1. Always treat you fairly with dignity and respect ensuring you have fair access to our services at a time that is reasonable and suitable for you.
2. Provide you with information so you know who your dedicated Neighbourhood Policing Team is, where they are based, how to contact them and how to work with them.
3. Ensure your Neighbourhood Policing Team and other police patrols are visible and on your patch at times when they will be most effective and when you tell us you most need them. We will ensure your team are not taken away from neighbourhood business more than is absolutely necessary. They will spend at least 80% of their time visibly working in your neighbourhood, tackling your priorities. Staff turnover will be minimised.
4. Respond to every message directed to your Neighbourhood Policing Team within 24 hours and, where necessary, provide a more detailed response as soon as we can.
5. Aim to answer 999 calls within 10 seconds, deploying to emergencies immediately giving an estimated time of arrival, getting to you safely, and as quickly as possible. In urban areas, we will aim to get to you within 15 minutes and in rural areas within 20 minutes.
6. Answer all non-emergency calls promptly. If attendance is needed, send a patrol giving you an estimated time of arrival, and:
 - If you are vulnerable or upset aim to be with you within 60 minutes.
 - If you are calling about an issue that we have agreed with your community will be a neighbourhood priority (listed opposite) and attendance is required, we will aim to be with you within 60 minutes.
 - Alternatively, if appropriate, we will make an appointment to see you at a time that fits in with your life and within 48 hours.
 - If agreed that attendance is not necessary we will give you advice, answer your questions and/or put you in touch with someone who can help.
7. Arrange regular public meetings to agree your priorities, at least once a month, giving you a chance to meet your local team with other members of your community. These will include opportunities such as surgeries, street briefings and mobile police station visits which will be arranged to meet local needs and requirements. Your local arrangements can be found opposite.
8. Provide monthly updates on progress, and on local crime and policing issues. This will include the provision of crime maps, information on specific crimes and what happened to those brought to justice, details of what action we and our partners are taking to make your neighbourhood safer and information on how your force is performing.
9. If you have been a victim of crime agree with you how often you would like to be kept informed of progress in your case and for how long. You have the right to be kept informed at least every month if you wish and for as long as is reasonable.
10. Acknowledge any dissatisfaction with the service you have received within 24 hours of reporting it to us. To help us fully resolve the matter, discuss with you how it will be handled, give you an opportunity to talk in person to someone about your concerns and agree with you what will be done about them and how quickly.

WE WANT TO DO OUR BEST FOR YOU BUT IF WE FAIL TO MEET OUR PLEDGE WE WILL ALWAYS EXPLAIN WHY IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE ON THAT OCCASION TO DELIVER THE HIGH STANDARDS TO WHICH WE ASPIRE AND YOU DESERVE.